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ABSTRACT 
More than fifty years ago, the U.S. Supreme Court famously proclaimed in Tinker v. Des Moines 
Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969), that students do not “shed their 
constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.”  In subsequent decades, the Supreme 
Court reduced the level of free-speech protections for public school students, but Tinker is still the lodestar decision.    
There remain several areas of uncertainty regarding the scope of student (K–12) First Amendment rights.  This 
Article addresses three of those main areas: (1) whether a student’s speech can be limited by the unruly behavior 
of listeners; (2) when student speech invades or infringes on the rights of other students; and (3) when school 
officials can punish students for off-campus, online speech.  All three areas have led to much disagreement and 
uncertainly among courts, school officials, parents, and commentators.   
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INTRODUCTION 
Fifty years ago, the United States Supreme Court famously declared in 
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District that “[i]t can hardly be 
argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to 
freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.”1  The decision 
ushered in a new era of protection for student expression, a new wave of 
litigation, and a genuine feeling that change was in the air.2  
Both courts3 and commentators4 have described Tinker as the “high water 
mark” for student free-expression rights.  The general consensus is that the 
 
 1 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).   
 2 See DAVID L. HUDSON, JR., LET THE STUDENTS SPEAK!: A HISTORY OF THE FIGHT FOR FREE 
EXPRESSION IN AMERICAN SCHOOLS 69, 84 (2011) (explaining that Tinker created a new sense of 
opportunity for student activists).   
 3 See Morgan v. Swanson, 659 F.3d 359, 374 (5th Cir. 2011) (“[Tinker] has been called the ‘high water 
mark’ of student speech rights.”); see also Broussard v. Sch. Bd. of Norfolk, 801 F. Supp. 1526, 1534 
(E.D. Va. 1992) (“Tinker . . . is the high-water mark for public school students’ First Amendment 
rights.”).   
 4 See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Deconstitutionalization of Education, 36 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 111, 124 (2004) 
(“[Tinker] was the high watermark of the Supreme Court protecting the constitutional rights of 
students.”); David L. Hudson, Jr., Black Armbands, “Boobies” Bracelets and the Need to Protect Student 
Speech, 81 UMKC L. REV. 595, 595 (2013) (“Tinker remains the ‘high water mark’ of student free-
speech rights.”); David L. Hudson, Jr. & John E. Ferguson, Jr., The Courts’ Inconsistent Treatment of 
Bethel v. Fraser and the Curtailment of Student Rights, 36 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 181, 185–86 (2002) 
(explaining that the prevailing view is that Tinker is the “high water mark” of student First 
Amendment rights); David L. Hudson, Jr., Fear of Violence in Our Schools: Is ‘Undifferentiated Fear’ in the 
Age of Columbine Leading to a Suppression of Student Speech?, 42 WASHBURN L.J. 79, 83 (2002) (noting 
that many scholars view Tinker as the “high water mark” of student First Amendment rights); 
Christine Metteer Lorillard, When Children’s Rights “Collide”: Free Speech vs. the Right to Be Let Alone in 
the Context of Off-Campus “Cyber-Bullying,” 81 MISS. L.J. 189, 195 (2011) (describing Tinker as the 
“zenith” of student First Amendment rights); Laura Rene McNeal, From Hoodies to Kneeling During the 
National Anthem: The Colin Kaepernick Effect and Its Implications for K–12 Sports, 78 LA. L. REV. 145, 166 
(2017) (describing the general view that Tinker represents the “pinnacle” of student-speech 
protections); Andrew D.M. Miller, Balancing School Authority and Student Expression, 54 BAYLOR L. 
REV. 623, 636 (2002) (describing Tinker as the “touchstone” and “high water mark” for student 
free-speech rights); Sean R. Nuttall, Note, Rethinking the Narrative on Judicial Deference in Student Speech 
Cases, 83 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1282, 1309–10 (2008) (noting that scholars view Tinker as the “high water 
mark” of student speech rights, but arguing that the Court in Tinker provided greater deference to 
school officials); Mark Strasser, Tinker Remorse: On Threats, Boobies, Bullying, and Parodies, 15 FIRST 
AMEND. L. REV. 1, 2 (2016) (describing the general view that Tinker represents the “high point” of 
student First Amendment rights); Nadine Strossen, Students’ Rights and How They Are Wronged, 32 U. 
RICH. L. REV. 457, 458 (1998) (“Unfortunately, Tinker was in many ways a high-water mark for 
students’ rights, and we have seen some sad back-sliding in Supreme Court decisions about 
students’ rights since then.”).  
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Warren Court in the late 1960s vindicated student free-expression rights and 
that subsequent Courts narrowed these rights in the following decades.5         
The Court in Tinker set the general standard and then in subsequent cases 
created so-called “Tinker carve-outs” for “vulgar and lewd” speech,6 school-
sponsored speech,7 and speech that school officials reasonably believe 
advocates the illegal use of drugs.8  As the Third Circuit explained in 2011, 
“Courts have recognized, time and again, that the three exceptions to Tinker’s 
general rule are independent ‘carve-outs.’”9  Furthermore, in these carve-out 
cases, the Court emphasized that “the constitutional rights of students in 
public school are not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in 
other settings.”10  
Despite the standards from these four main student First Amendment 
cases, many unsettled questions remain in the area of K–12 student speech.  
Several of the most prominent questions relate directly to the interpretation 
or application of the Tinker decision itself.  This Article addresses several of 
these areas where uncertainty remains.  These areas of uncertainty include:  
 
 5 See JOHN W. JOHNSON,  THE STRUGGLE FOR STUDENT RIGHTS: TINKER V. DES MOINES AND THE 
1960S, at 206 (1997) (“The Tinker decision is still ‘good law’ . . . but Court decisions of recent years 
have undercut it.”); Clay Calvert, Tinker’s Midlife Crisis: Tattered and Transgressed But Still Standing, 58 
AM. U. L. REV. 1167, 1173 (2009) (noting that subsequent Supreme Court decisions have undercut 
Tinker); Amanda Harmon Cooley, Inculcating Suppression, 107 GEO. L.J. 365, 377 (2019) 
(“Capitalizing on Tinker’s discussion of the preeminence of state school control over students, the 
Court’s subsequent student speech jurisprudence has allowed for the restriction of student speech 
with increasing amounts of discretion granted to school officials.”); Thomas C. Fischer, “Whatever 
Happened to Mary Beth Tinker” and Other Sagas in the Academic “Marketplace of Ideas,” 23 GOLDEN GATE 
U. L. REV. 351, 358 (1993) (“Generally speaking, however, students and teachers have lost rights 
over the past twenty years.  In the process, the Supreme Court has established a new Constitutional 
balance and new legal standards.”); Stuart L. Leviton, Is Anyone Listening to Our Students? A Plea for 
Respect and Inclusion, 21 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 35, 44–45 (1993) (explaining that, in the 1980s, a more 
conservative U.S. Supreme Court cut back on the protections for students in Tinker).  
 6 Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986) (“The First Amendment does not prevent the 
school officials from determining that to permit a vulgar and lewd speech . . . would undermine the 
school's basic educational mission.”). 
 7 See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988) (“Educators do not offend the 
First Amendment by exercising editorial control over the style and content of student speech in 
school-sponsored expressive activities so long as their actions are reasonably related to legitimate 
pedagogical concerns.”). 
 8 See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 403 (2007) (holding that a principal may “restrict student 
speech at a school event, when that speech is reasonably viewed as promoting illegal drug use”).  
 9 B.H. ex. rel. Hawk v. Easton Area Sch. Dist., 725 F.3d 293, 331 (3d Cir. 2011) (Hardiman, J., 
dissenting).  
 10 Fraser, 678 U.S. at 482.  
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(1) whether a student’s speech can be limited by the unruly behavior of 
listeners;  (2) when student speech invades the rights of other students;  and 
(3) when school officials can punish students for off-campus, online speech.  
All three areas have led to much disagreement among courts, school officials, 
parents, and commentators.   
Part I examines the role of the “heckler’s veto” in Tinker’s substantial 
disruption analysis.  Part II evaluates the meaning of Tinker’s often forgotten 
prong—the invasion of the rights of others.  And Part III examines the extent 
of school officials’ authority over off-campus, social media speech.   
I.  UNPACKING THE SUBSTANTIAL DISRUPTION TEST IN TINKER:  DOES 
IT MATTER WHO DOES THE DISRUPTING?  
In Tinker, several public school students wore black armbands to protest 
U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War, support Robert Kennedy’s Christmas 
truce, and mourn those who had died in the war.11  “When we were told that 
we would not be allowed to express our opinion about the war in this purely 
nonviolent and nondisruptive way, we felt that there had been an offense 
against a principle that we were obligated to try to defend,” John Tinker 
said.12   
Des Moines public school officials learned of the impending protest and 
quickly passed a resolution that banned the wearing of armbands.13  Several 
students—including litigants John, his sister Mary Beth Tinker, and 
Christopher Eckhardt14—wore the armbands to school and incurred 
suspensions.15  They challenged their suspensions in federal court.  They lost 
 
 11 See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 504 (1969) (detailing the 
circumstances behind the lawsuit).  
 12 David L. Hudson, Jr., Student Free Speech Case ‘Chipped Away’ at After 50 Years, but ‘Overall Idea’ Remains, 
A.B.A. J. (Feb. 25, 2019, 6:00 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/web/article/50th-anniversary-
of-tinker-v-des-moines.   
 13 See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504 (explaining the school policy that inspired the lawsuit).   
 14 Eckhardt, who passed away several years ago, was the often-forgotten plaintiff in the case as the 
style of the case began with Tinker.  But he remained a committed champion for individual rights.  
See David L. Hudson, Jr., Christopher Eckhardt Left His Mark as Student-Speech Litigant, FREEDOM F. 
INST. (Jan. 3, 2013), https://www.freedomforuminstitute.org/2013/01/03/christopher-eckhardt-
left-his-mark-as-student-speech-litigant/.   
 15 See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504 (detailing the circumstances behind the lawsuit).   
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before a federal district court judge16 and could fare no better than a 4–4 tie 
at the federal appeals court level.17    
The students pursued their cause to the U.S. Supreme Court, which 
rewarded them with a 7–2 victory.18  The Court explained that students do 
not lose their First Amendment free-speech rights at the schoolhouse gate but 
also emphasized that those rights must be interpreted in light of the “special 
characteristics of the school environment.”19    
The Court emphasized that the armbands were a form of passive political 
speech that did not cause any great disruption of school activities.  The Court 
fashioned what came to be known as the “substantial disruption” test.  It is 
known as the dominant test from the Tinker decision.20  However, the Court’s 
opinion in Tinker uses different language to describe this test.  Consider the 
following passages from Justice Fortas’ opinion:  
But conduct by the student, in class or out of it, which for any reason—
whether it stems from time, place, or type of behavior—materially disrupts 
classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others 
is, of course, not immunized by the constitutional guarantee of freedom of 
speech.   
. . . .  
As we have discussed, the record does not demonstrate any facts which 
might reasonably have led school authorities to forecast substantial 
disruption of or material interference with school activities, and no 
disturbances or disorders on the school premises in fact occurred.21 
The first passage emphasizes that the students’ wearing of the armbands 
did not cause a material disruption or substantial disorder.  The second 
passage provides that school officials could not reasonably forecast that the 
students’ armbands, would cause a substantial disruption or material 
interference of school activities.   
 
 16 See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist. (Tinker I), 258 F. Supp. 971 (S.D. Iowa 1966).  
 17 See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist. (Tinker II), 383 F.2d 988 (8th Cir. 1967).  
 18 See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 503.   
 19 Id. at 506.   
 20 See David L. Hudson, Jr., Substantial Disruption Test, FIRST AMEND. ENCYCLOPEDIA (2009), 
https://www.mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/1584/substantial-disruption-test (explaining the 
test used for determining whether a public school can bar speech under Tinker); see also David L. 
Hudson, Jr., The Leading Student-Speech Standard: Reasonable Forecast of Substantial Disruption, NAT’L 
ASS’N SCH. RES. OFFICERS: LEGAL UPDATE (Fall 2014) (same).   
 21 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513–14.   
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The second passage has won out over time in the lower courts.  Under 
most student-speech K–12 cases, school officials do not have to wait for an 
actual substantial disruption.22  Instead, they have to point to specific facts in 
the school environment that would allow them to reasonably forecast that 
there could be a substantial disruption.  
But, this reasonable forecast of substantial disruption test is not easy to 
apply.23  An area of uncertainty resides in whether courts will allow the 
negative reaction of listeners to silence the student speakers.  Stated another 
way, will courts allow negative reactions of other students to silence, or 
impose a heckler’s veto, on the student speaker who engages in peaceful 
expression?   
Currently, there is a circuit split on whether a heckler’s veto should be 
incorporated into the Tinker substantial-disruption analysis.24  The Ninth 
Circuit allows a heckler’s veto,25 while the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits 
ostensibly do not.26  The Ninth Circuit ruled in Dariano v. Morgan Hills Unified 
School District that an assistant principal could prevent five Caucasian students 
from wearing t-shirts with the American flag on them on Cinco de Mayo, a 
Mexican holiday, because it would offend other students.27  
The five wearers of the American flag t-shirts engaged in no disruptive 
behavior on their own.  They simply wore t-shirts.  The school officials were 
concerned about the hostile response from some Latino students.  The 
assistant principal expressed concern over the t-shirts in part because there 
was racial tension during Cinco de Mayo during the previous school year.28 
 
 22 See Lowery v. Euverard, 497 F.3d 584, 593 (6th Cir. 2007) (“Tinker does not require disruption to 
have actually occurred.”); Karp v. Becken, 477 F.2d 171, 175 (9th Cir. 1973) (“First, the First 
Amendment does not require school officials to wait until disruption actually occurs before they 
may act.  In fact, they have a duty to prevent the occurrence of disturbances.  Second, Tinker does 
not demand a certainty that disruption will occur, but rather the existence of facts which might 
reasonably lead school officials to forecast substantial disruption.”).  
 23 See Karp, 477 F.2d at 174 (“The Tinker rule is simply stated; application, however, is more difficult.”).  
 24 See Katherine M. Porter, Comment, Tinker’s Timeless Teaching: Why the Heckler’s Veto Should Not Be 
Allowed in Public High Schools, 86 MISS. L.J. 409, 428 (2017) (addressing the split between the Seventh, 
Eleventh, and Ninth Circuits).   
 25 See Dariano v. Morgan Hills Unified Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 764 (9th Cir. 2014) (upholding a school 
district’s dress policy).   
 26 See Zamecnik v. Indian Prairie Sch. Dist., 636 F.3d 874, 879 (7th Cir. 2011); Holloman v. Harland, 
370 F.3d 1252, 1275 (11th Cir. 2004) (holding that the school district had violated the student’s free 
speech).   
 27 See Dariano, 767 F.3d at 774–75.   
 28 See id. at 777.  
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The Ninth Circuit in Dariano emphasized that “the crucial distinction is 
the nature of the speech, not the source of it.”29  In other words, it doesn’t 
matter from where the disruption occurs or from where school officials 
reasonably forecast where there will be a disruption—if there is a reasonable 
forecast of substantial disruption, then school officials can censor the peaceful 
students’ expression. 
Judge Diarmund O’Scannlain wrote a scathing dissent from a denial of 
en banc review.  He emphasized that the t-shirt wearing students exercised 
their free-speech rights peacefully and passively.30  He also warned that his 
colleagues had “condon[ed] the suppression of the students’ speech for one 
reason:  other students might have reacted violently against them.”31  The 
lesson of the majority decision to students, according to O’Scannlain, was the 
following: “by threatening violence against those with whom you disagree, 
you can enlist the power of the State to silence them.”32 
The Seventh Circuit reached a different result in a case involving a 
student who wore a t-shirt to school bearing the message “Be Happy, Not 
Gay.”33  School officials sought to prohibit the student from wearing the t-
shirt based in part on the fact that other students harassed the T-shirt wearer, 
Zamecnik.34  The Seventh Circuit rejected the school officials’ reasoning as 
“barred by . . . the heckler’s veto.”35  The Seventh Circuit explained:  
Statements that while not fighting words are met by violence or threats or 
other unprivileged retaliatory conduct by persons offended by them cannot 
lawfully be suppressed because of that conduct.  Otherwise free speech could 
be stifled by the speaker’s opponents’ mounting a riot, even though, because 
the speech had contained no fighting words, no reasonable person would 
have been moved to a riotous response.  So the fact that homosexual students 
and their sympathizers harassed Zamecnik because of their disapproval of 
her message is not a permissible ground for banning it.36  
 
 29 Id. at 778.   
 30 See id. (highlighting the peaceful exercise of the student’s free speech rights).  
 31 Id. at 768, (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting). 
 32 Id. at 770.  
 33 Zamecnik v. Indian Prairie Sch. Dist., 636 F.3d 874, 875 (7th Cir. 2011).   
 34 See id. at 879 (noting that the school district presented “incidents of harassment of plaintiff 
Zamecnik” in its argument that the shirt should be prohibited from campus).   
 35 Id. 
 36 Id.  
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Interestingly, Mary Beth and John Tinker filed an amicus brief urging 
the U.S. Supreme Court to review the Ninth Circuit decision.37  The brief 
explained that the Tinkers’ speech itself—the black armbands as a form of 
protest—was controversial and banned by school officials in Des Moines 
because they feared it might cause disruption.38  It also emphasized that the 
use of the heckler’s veto could have silenced many civil rights speakers during 
the Civil Rights Movement, as those protesting against segregation were 
often confronted by angry mobs and upset segregationists: “Limiting 
peaceful civil rights expression because of the fear of violent crowd reactions 
would have severely undermined both the First Amendment and the cause 
of equality.”39 
This issue needs to be resolved by the U.S. Supreme Court.  Students, 
administrators, and others concerned need to know with certainty whether a 
peaceful student speaker can be punished because of the unruly actions of 
others.   
II.  WHEN DOES STUDENT SPEECH INVADE THE RIGHTS OF OTHERS?  
As mentioned, the dominant standard from the Tinker decision is the 
substantial disruption test, or the reasonable forecast of a substantial 
disruption.40  However, there is another passage from the Tinker decision that 
speaks about student speech that invades or impinges upon the rights of 
others.  The Court in Tinker wrote:  
There is here no evidence whatever of petitioners’ interference, actual or 
nascent, with the schools’ work or of collision with the rights of other students 
to be secure and to be let alone.  Accordingly, this case does not concern 
speech or action that intrudes upon the work of the schools or the rights of 
other students.41 
. . . . 
In the present case, the District Court made no such finding, and our 
independent examination of the record fails to yield evidence that the school 
 
 37 See Brief for Mary Beth Tinker and John Tinker as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Dariano 
v. Morgan Hill Unified Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 764 (9th Cir. 2014) (No. 14-720) (urging the U.S. 
Supreme Court to review the Ninth Circuit’s decision).   
 38 See id. at 7–8. 
 39 Id. at 10. 
 40 See Emily Gold Waldman, A Post-Morse Framework for Students’ Potentially Hurtful Speech (Religious and 
Otherwise), 37 J.L. & EDUC. 463, 467 (2008) (referring to the substantial disruption test as the 
“dominant prong” of Tinker).   
 41 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969).   
 
June 2020] UNSETTLED QUESTIONS IN STUDENT SPEECH LAW 1121 
   
 
authorities had reason to anticipate that the wearing of the armbands would 
substantially interfere with the work of the school or impinge upon the rights 
of other students.42 
. . . .  
When he is in the cafeteria, or on the playing field, or on the campus 
during the authorized hours, he may express his opinions, even on 
controversial subjects like the conflict in Vietnam, if he does so without 
“materially and substantially interfer[ing] with the requirements of 
appropriate discipline in the operation of the school” and without colliding 
with the rights of others. . . .  But conduct by the student, in class or out of 
it, which for any reason—whether it stems from time, place, or type of 
behavior—materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or 
invasion of the rights of others is, of course, not immunized by the 
constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech.43 
. . . .  
They neither interrupted school activities nor sought to intrude in the 
school affairs or the lives of others.44 
In these four passages, the Court in Tinker intimates that student speech 
can be prohibited if the student speakers invade the rights of others, impinge 
on the rights of others, or their speech collides with the rights of others.45  
This is called the “invasion of the rights of others” prong of the Tinker test.  It 
has also been referred to as the “forgotten part” of the Tinker case.46   
Questions abound regarding the use of this standard.  When exactly does 
student speech invade the rights of other students?  Can school officials use 
this standard to support bullying and cyberbullying laws?  Can this standard 
be used when a student utters one ill-timed remark, or must the student 
speech constitute severe and pervasive harassment?    
The U.S. Supreme Court has never explained the contours of the 
“invasion of the rights” prong of Tinker.  As a result, many lower courts never 
 
 42 Id. at 509.  
 43 Id.  at 512–13.  
 44 Id. at 514.   
 45 See id. at 508–09, 512–14 (noting that student speech can be prohibited under circumstance where 
speakers invade or impinge the rights of others, or their speech collides with the rights of others).  
 46 See David L. Hudson, Jr., Tinkering with Tinker Standards?, FREEDOM F. INST. (Aug. 9, 2006), 
https://www.freedomforuminstitute.org/2006/08/09/tinkering-with-tinker-standards/ (referring 
to the invasion of the rights of others as the “forgotten part” of the Tinker case); see generally David L. 
Hudson, Jr., Time for the Supreme Court to Address Off-Campus, Online Student Speech, 91 OR. L. REV. 621 
(2012) (proposing the expansion of speech-in-school jurisprudence to the internet).  
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even refer to this standard in student-speech cases.47  However, the Second 
Circuit picked up on the language very soon after the Tinker decision, 
pointing out its potential vagueness: “The phrase ‘invasion of the rights of 
others’ is not a model of clarity or preciseness.”48  
A few years later, the Second Circuit examined whether public school 
officials in Stuyesvant, New York violated the First Amendment when they 
prohibited student Jeff Trachtman and others from publishing in the school 
newspaper a sex survey of fellow students.49  School officials prohibited the 
students from publishing the survey because they contended it would be 
harmful to students.  A federal district court enjoined the school officials from 
prohibiting the publication of the survey.50  The Second Circuit reversed, 
finding that school officials could enjoin the publication in order to prevent 
psychological harm to some students.51  The court explained: “The First 
Amendment right to express one’s views does not include the right to 
importune others to respond to questions when there is reason to believe that 
such importuning may result in harmful consequences.”52  The appeals court 
seemed to base its decision on both prongs of Tinker, both substantial 
disruption and the invasion of the rights of others. 
One judge dissented, questioning the broad nature of the phrase 
“invasion of the rights of others” and its broad application in this case.  “The 
possibilities for harmful censorship under the guise of ‘protecting’ the rights 
of students against emotional strain are sufficiently numerous to be 
frightening,” he wrote.53 
 
 47 See Hudson, Time for the Supreme Court to Address Off-Campus, Online Student Speech, supra note 46, at 624 
(highlighting the tendency of courts to under-emphasize the “invasion of the rights of others” prong 
of Tinker); Karly Zande, When the School Bully Attacks in the Living Room: Using Tinker to Regulate Off-
Campus Cyberbullying, 13 BARRY L. REV. 103, 117 (2009) (“Curiously, though, very few courts have 
addressed the Tinker Court’s statement that a school can regulate speech that impinges on the rights 
of other students, leaving this standard regrettably ambiguous.”).   
 48 Eisner v. Stamford Bd. of Educ., 440 F.2d 803, 808 (2d Cir. 1971) (noting the lack of clarity 
provided by the invasion of rights prong of Tinker).  
 49 See Trachtman v. Anker, 563 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1977) (allowing a school district to censor speech 
that was harmful to students).   
 50 See id. at 514 (noting that the district court “enjoined [the] defendants from restraining plaintiffs’ 
attempts to distribute a sex questionnaire to eleventh and twelfth grade students”). 
 51 See id. at 520 (ruling in favor of the school district). 
 52 Id. at 519–20 (footnote omitted).  
 53 Id. at 521 (Mansfield, J., dissenting).   
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The Eighth Circuit in the Hazelwood case read the phrase “invasion of the 
rights of others” as pertaining to “that speech [which] could result in tort 
liability.”54  The Eighth Circuit explained that “[a]ny yardstick less exacting 
than potential tort liability could result in school officials curtailing speech at 
the slightest fear of disturbance.”55  School officials, as we know, appealed 
this decision and the Supreme Court granted review, ultimately creating a 
new standard for school-sponsored student speech that was less protective of 
student rights.56 
The majority in Hazelwood did not address the invasion of the rights of 
others prong in its decision.  However, Justice William Brennan did address 
the subject briefly in his dissenting opinion in the school newspaper case, 
Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier—a case in which the Court ruled that a 
high school principal could censor two student-written articles dealing with 
teen pregnancy and the impact of divorce upon teens.57  In Hazelwood, the 
Court created a new standard more deferential to school officials—that 
school officials could prohibit school-sponsored student speech if they had a 
legitimate pedagogical or educational reason for doing so.58   
Because the majority in Hazelwood created a new standard apart from the 
Tinker case it declined to address the “invasion of the others” prong of Tinker.  
However, Justice Brennan addressed it in his poignant dissenting opinion.  
Speaking of the invasion of rights of others, Justice Brennan wrote: “If that 
term is to have any content, it must be limited to rights that are protected by 
law.”59  If the term had broader meaning, according to Justice Brennan, it 
could be applied to limit almost any type of speech that school officials 
thought had “the slightest fear of disturbance.”60  Justice Brennan also agreed 
 
 54 Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood Sch. Dist., 795 F.2d 1368, 1376 (8th Cir. 1986).   
 55 Id.    
 56 See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988) (creating a rational-basis-type 
standard for school sponsored speech, allowing school officials to censor speech when they have a 
legitimate educational, or pedagogical, reason for doing so).   
 57 See id. at 276, 280–81 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (addressing the “invasion of the rights of others” 
prong of Tinker”).  For more information on the Hazelwood case, see David L. Hudson, Jr., Thirty 
Years of Hazelwood and Its Spread to Colleges and University Campuses, 61 HOW. L.J. 491, 491–492 (2018) 
(analyzing the Court’s new rule for school sponsored student speech, and the effects of the rule on 
students across the country).  
 58 See Hazelwood Sch. Dist., 484 U.S. at 273 (creating a standard more deferential to school officials for 
student-speech cases). 
 59 Id. at 289 (Brennan, J., dissenting).   
 60 Id. (quoting Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood Sch. Dist., 795 F.2d 1368, 1376 (8th Cir. 1986)).   
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with the Eighth Circuit’s application of Tinker that the articles in question in 
the Hazelwood case certainly were not tortious or criminal.61 
Under Justice Brennan’s interpretation of the invasion of the rights of 
others test from Tinker, the test only applies if the offending speech rises to 
the level of a tort or a crime.  Thus, the standard might apply to speech that 
defamed another person, invaded their privacy to a significant degree, or 
rose to the level of the intentional infliction of emotional distress.  
For many years after Hazelwood, there was little judicial interpretation of 
the phrase “invasion of the rights of others.”  Instead, lower courts simply 
applied the dominant test of Tinker—reasonable forecast of substantial 
disruption.  That changed with the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Harper v. Poway 
Unified School District, a case involving a high school student who wore t-shirts 
with religious-based messages against homosexuality.62  The Ninth Circuit 
applied the invasion of the rights of others standard much more broadly than 
Justice Brennan’s interpretation in Hazelwood.  
During his sophomore year, Harper wore t-shirts expressing his 
opposition to his school’s support of the National Day of Silence, a student-
led protest designed to promote equality and respect for LGBTQ students.  
The shirts bore the messages “I WILL NOT ACCEPT WHAT GOD HAS 
CONDEMNED” and “HOMOSEXUALITY IS SHAMEFUL. Romans 
1:27.”63  The next day he wore a t-shirt with a similar message.  A teacher 
told Harper that his t-shirt was “inflammatory” and created a “hostile 
working environment” for others.64  An assistant principal also told Harper 
that the t-shirt was inflammatory and that he should not wear them again.65  
The principal then flatly prohibited Harper from wearing the t-shirts.66 
Harper sued, alleging many constitutional claims, including free-speech 
and free-exercise of religion claims.67  A federal district court refused to grant 
Harper a preliminary injunction.68  On appeal, the Ninth Circuit ruled in 
 
 61 See Hazelwood Sch. Dist., 484 U.S. at 289–90 (citing Hazelwood Sch. Dist., 795 F.2d at 1375–76).  
 62 Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 445 F.3d 1166, 1177 (9th Cir. 2006).   
 63 Id. at 1171 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 64 Id. at 1171–72.  
 65 See id. at 1172 (noting that the assistant principal informed Harper that he could return to class only 
if he removed his inflammatory t-shirt). 
 66 See id. (describing the incident that inspired the lawsuit).  
 67 See id. at 1173 (listing the student’s causes of action).  
 68 See id. (summarizing the procedural history).  
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favor of the school officials based on the oft-forgotten prong of Tinker.69  
Harper had argued that the “invasion of the rights of others” prong only 
protected other students from actual physical invasions of their privacy.70  
The Ninth Circuit disagreed, writing that Harper’s t-shirts collided with the 
rights of gay and lesbian students “in a most fundamental way.”71  Judge 
Stephen Reinhardt wrote:  
Speech that attacks high school students who are members of minority 
groups that have historically been oppressed, subjected to verbal and 
physical abuse, and made to feel inferior, serves to injure and intimidate 
them, as well as to damage their sense of security and interfere with their 
opportunity to learn.72 
Reinhardt emphasized that gay and lesbian youth were more prone to 
academic underachievement and truancy because of bullying and 
harassment committed against them.73  He noted that gay teens drop out at 
three times the national average rate.74  He concluded that “the School had 
a valid and lawful basis for restricting Harper’s wearing of his T-shirt on the 
ground that his conduct was injurious to gay and lesbian students and 
interfered with their right to learn.”75 
Judge Alex Kozinski dissented, pointing out the difficult interaction 
between harassment law and the First Amendment.76  “The interaction 
between harassment law and the First Amendment is a difficult and unsettled 
one because much of what harassment law seeks to prohibit, the First 
Amendment seems to protect,” he wrote.77  He explained that a school might 
be able to prevent a student’s harassing speech under the invasion of rights 
part of Tinker if the harassment was severe or pervasive.78  Severe and 
 
 69 See id. at 1178.  
 70 Id. at 1177.   
 71 Id. at 1178.   
 72 Id. 
 73 See id. at 1179 (noting the study that found that, “among teenage victims of anti-gay discrimination, 
75% experienced a decline in academic performance, 39% had truancy problems, and 28% 
dropped out of school”).    
 74 See id. (comparing the drop-out rate of gay students to the national average).   
 75 Id. at 1180.   
 76 See id. at 1198 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (“The interaction between harassment law and the First 
Amendment is a difficult and unsettled one because much of what harassment law seeks to prohibit, 
the First Amendment seems to protect.”).   
 77 Id.  
 78 See id. (applying the long neglected “invasion of the rights of others” prong of Tinker). 
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pervasive is the standard often used to determine whether speech rises to the 
level of sexual or racial harassment in employment law.79  
Judge Kozinski concluded that “[t]he ‘rights of others’ language in Tinker 
can only refer to traditional rights, such as those against assault, defamation, 
invasion of privacy, extortion and blackmail, whose interplay with the First 
Amendment is well established.”80 
The Third Circuit differs in its interpretation of the invasion of the rights 
of others.  Writing for the Third Circuit, then-Judge Samuel Alito 
acknowledged that there was uncertainty as to the scope of this part of 
Tinker.81  The court explained that “[t]he precise scope of Tinker’s 
‘interference with the rights of others’ language is unclear.”82  But, Judge 
Alito elaborated that whatever its precise scope, it surely cannot apply to 
speech that is merely offensive to others.83   
A federal district court also determined that the invasion of the rights of 
others did not apply to a public high school student’s in-class speech that he 
did not accept gays for religious reasons.84  The student’s teacher had worn 
a purple anti-bullying t-shirt in support of Tyler Clementi, the gay Rutgers 
University student who killed himself after harassment from other students.85  
The teacher then ordered a female student to remove a Confederate belt 
buckle.86 
Student Daniel Glowacki then asked why the student had to remove her 
Confederate belt buckle but the teacher could wear the purple anti-bullying 
shirt.87  A discussion ensued and at one point Glowacki stated: “I don’t accept 
gays because I’m Catholic.”88  The teacher then ordered Glowacki to leave 
 
 79     Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21–22 (1993); Meritor Sav. Bank, F.S.B. v. Vinson, 477 
U.S. 57, 67 (1986).   
 80 Id.  
 81 See Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 217 (3d Cir. 2001) (addressing the uncertainty 
of the scope of the “invasion of the rights of others” prong of Tinker).  
 82 Id.  
 83 See id. (noting the potential danger of assigning broad scope to the “invasion of the rights of others” 
prong).  
 84 See Glowacki v. Howell Pub. Sch. Dist., No. 2:11-cv-15481, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85960, at *10, 
*25–26 (E.D. Mich. June 19, 2013) (rejecting the application of Tinker’s “interference with the rights 
of others” language to religious speech in school).   
 85 See id. at *7–8 (detailing the factual background). 
 86 See id. at *8. 
 87 See id. at *9. 
 88 Id. at *10 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
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the class.89  The student sued, alleging a violation of his First Amendment 
free-speech rights.  The school and teacher argued that Glowacki’s free-
speech rights were not violated because his speech intruded upon the rights 
of gay students.90 
The federal district court reasoned that in order to punish a student for 
speech that invades the rights of other students, the speech must involve 
something more than creating discomfort or unpleasantness.91  The court 
stated:  “Simply put, the law does ‘not establish a generalized “hurt feelings” 
defense to a high school’s violation of the First Amendment rights of its 
students . . . .’”92 
The court explained that Tinker requires “some sort of threat or direct 
confrontation” before the school can punish speech for invading the rights of 
others.93  The court quoted Tinker:  “[there was] no evidence . . . , actual or 
nascent, . . . of collision with the rights of other students to be secure and to 
be let alone.”94   
Legal scholar and law professor Catherine J. Ross explains that Tinker’s 
rights of others language “must mean more than a conflict with the 
sensibilities or preferences of those who hear the offensive speech.”95  Ross 
calls for what she terms an “infringement matrix” for school officials to 
consider before punishing students for speech that supposedly invades the 
rights of others.96  This matrix consists of several factors, including: “whether 
the asserted infringement resembled harassment by virtue of being directed 
to one or more targeted individuals and whether it was aggressive and ‘in 
your face,’ pervasive, severe, objectively offensive, threatening, or . . . 
‘intolerable.’”97  Ross explains that this analysis would be a totality of the 
circumstances evaluation and no single factor would be dispositive.98 
 
 89 See id. at *11. 
 90 See id. at *22 (explaining the defendants’ argument). 
 91 See id. at *24 describing the relative degree of harm required for a student to be punished for speech).   
 92 Id. at *24 (quoting Zamecnik v. Indian Prairie Sch. Dist. No. 204, 636 F.3d 874, 877 (7th Cir. 
2011)).   
 93 Id. at *25.  
 94 Id. (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969)). 
 95 CATHERINE J. ROSS, LESSONS IN CENSORSHIP: HOW SCHOOLS AND COURTS SUBVERT 
STUDENTS’ FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS 194 (2015).  
 96 Id. at 195.  
 97 Id.   
 98 Id.   
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Another prominent student-speech scholar, Professor Emily Gold 
Waldman, posits that the key distinction in these cases is whether the student 
speech targets a specific student or individual or whether the speech expresses 
a general political or religious viewpoint.99  Certainly, when student speech 
targets a specific individual as opposed to general comments, there is a much 
greater likelihood that the receiving student will feel pressure or perhaps even 
harassment.   
Still, there is no definitive explanation of the phrase “invasion of the rights 
of others.”  The most likely application is that it applies to speech that could 
result in tort or criminal liability.  But there are seeds of doubt planted by 
cases like Harper v. Poway Unified School District.   
Once again, this area likely will need clarification from the U.S. Supreme 
Court.  Students, administrators, teachers, parents, and others need to know 
what the applicable rule is regarding student speech that offends other 
students to the extent that they claim some sort of invasion or infringement.  
III.  OFF-CAMPUS SPEECH ON SOCIAL MEDIA  
Arguably the most pressing question in student-speech law concerns the 
extent of school officials’ authority to regulate students’ off-campus, online 
speech.100  Students’ use of social media is pervasive and arguably the most 
common way that students communicate in the present day.101  It is a 
ubiquitous reality in modern-day life.  Professor Ross explains that the 
pressures to regulate such off-campus speech are enormous: “State 
legislatures, teachers, some parents, and even agencies of the federal 
government increasingly look to school disciplinarians to rein in student 
speech that takes place off campus, outside of school hours, and online.”102 
 
 99 See Waldman, supra note 40, at 492 (distinguishing two types of potentially hurtful student speech).   
 100 See Clay Calvert, Punishing Public School Students for Bashing Principals, Teachers & Classmates in Cyberspace: 
The Speech Issue the Supreme Court Must Now Resolve, 7 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 210, 218 (2009) (“The 
need to examine the issue of the jurisdictional authority of public schools over high-tech, off-
campus-created student expression thus is both paramount and timely.”).  
 101 See Mary Sue Backus, OMG! Missing the Teachable Moment and Undermining the Future of the First 
Amendment—TISNF!, 60 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 153, 158 (2009) (noting that “[a]n overwhelming 
number of teens are adept Internet users”).   
 102 ROSS, supra note 95, at 207.   
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Through the years, students have been punished for mocking school 
officials online with a fake profile,103 bullying other students online, creating 
parodies online of school officials, posting rap lyrics that school officials 
deemed threatening,104 and a variety of other variants.  The fear is that school 
officials are overextending their authority by flexing their disciplinary 
muscles to punish students for matters that are better left for parental 
discipline or, in worse cases, law enforcement.105  Others, however, voice 
concerns from the opposite direction—namely that school officials 
desperately need the authority to regulate off-campus, online student speech 
because of the pervasive problem of bullying.106 
One legal scholar has identified at least five different approaches to the 
problem: (1) no authority to regulate off-campus speech; (2) little to no 
distinction between off-campus and on-campus expression; (3) requiring a 
sufficient nexus between the off-campus expression and the school 
environment; (4) requiring that the online speech creator reasonably forecast 
that the student speech reach the school environment; and (5) limiting school 
officials’ authority to act when there is a clear and identifiable threat.107 
 The general rule is that public school officials must show some sort of 
connection or nexus between off-campus, online student speech and 
something that occurs at school.108  James C. Hanks, author of School Bullying: 
 
 103 See, e.g., Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 207, 210 (3d Cir. 2011) (describing an 
instance in which a high school student was punished for creating a degrading “parody profile” of 
his school principal). 
 104 See, e.g., Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379, 379, 384 (5th Cir. 2015) (examining a 
situation in which a high school student posted an “incredibly profane” and “vulgar” rap recording 
about two school administrators on his social media).  
 105 See ROSS, supra note 95, at 207 (“The assertion of authority over off-campus speech is a breach of 
remarkable proportions, amounting to an abuse of power.”).   
 106 See, e.g., Jennifer Butwin, Note, Children Are Crying and Dying While the Supreme Court is Hiding: Why 
Public Schools Should Have Broad Authority to Regulate Off-Campus Bullying “Speech,” 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 
671, 693 (2018) (“It is important for schools to have the authority to regulate student speech that 
occurs both on and off campus because schools are tasked with creating safe environments 
conducive to learning.  Bullying that occurs either on or off campus causes real harm and prevents 
schools from providing safe learning environments.”).  
 107 See Philip Lee, Expanding the Schoolhouse Gate: Public Schools (K–12) and the Regulation of Cyberbullying, 
2016 UTAH L. REV. 831, 848 (2016) (listing possible approaches for using Tinker doctrine to address 
cyberbullying).   
 108 See ROSS, supra note 95, at 207 (explaining a school district’s burden for regulating student online 
speech).   
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How Long Is the Arm of the Law?, agrees, writing that “courts thus far are saying 
‘Show me the nexus!’”109 
 In other words, most courts will apply the Tinker substantial disruption 
standard to students’ social media speech as long as there was a reasonable 
foreseeability that the student’s off-campus speech will have an impact on the 
school environment or there is a clear nexus, or connection, between the 
student’s social media posts and events at school.110 
However, the federal circuit courts of appeals have not reached consistent 
results when addressing how to determine whether school officials have the 
authority to discipline students for such speech.111  The courts have approved 
of a variety of tests for analyzing student digital speech cases.  These include 
the “reasonable foreseeability” test from the Eighth Circuit112 and the 
“nexus” test from the Fourth Circuit.113  Such requirements are designed to 
ensure that the school is not overextending its jurisdictional authority.  As 
Professor Ross explains: “Almost universally, courts require the school to 
show a ‘nexus,’ or close connection, between the speech and the school or 
 
 109 JAMES C. HANKS, SCHOOL BULLYING: HOW LONG IS THE ARM OF THE LAW 99–100 (2d ed. 
2015).  
 110 See, e.g., D.J.M. v. Hannibal Pub. Sch. Dist., 647 F.3d 754, 766 (8th Cir. 2011) (applying Tinker to 
off-campus student speech that was threatening if it was “reasonably foreseeable” that the speech 
would cause a substantial disruption at school); Kowalski v. Berkeley Cty. Sch., 652 F.3d 565, 573 
(4th Cir. 2011) (“There is surely a limit to the scope of a high school’s interest in the order, safety, 
and well-being of its students when the speech at issue originates outside the schoolhouse gate.  But 
we need not fully define that limit here, as we are satisfied that the nexus of Kowalski’s speech to 
Musselman High School’s pedagogical interests was sufficiently strong to justify the action taken by 
school officials in carrying out their role as the trustees of the student body’s well-being.”).   
 111 See Aaron J. Hersh, Note, Rehabilitating Tinker: A Modest Proposal to Protect Public-School Students’ First 
Amendment Free Expression Rights in the Digital Age, 98 IOWA L. REV. 1309, 1312–13 (2013) (“This 
growing ambiguity is most evident in recent circuit-court cases in which the Second, Third, and 
Fourth Circuits have applied differing standards, invoked inconsistent reasoning, and reached 
incompatible results in student online-expression cases.”); see also David L. Hudson, Jr., Time for the 
Supreme Court to Address Off-Campus, Online Student Speech, 91 OR. L. REV. 621, 621–22 (2012) 
(proposing the expansion of speech-in-school jurisprudence to the internet); Joseph A. Tomain, 
Cyberspace is Outside the Schoolhouse Gate: Offensive, Online Student Speech Receives First Amendment Protection, 
59 DRAKE L. REV. 97, 102–03 (2010) (“Not only are lower court decisions in disarray as to the 
limits of school jurisdiction over online student speech, legal commentary also exhibits uncertainty 
as to these limits.”).   
 112 See S.J.W. v. Lee’s Summit R-7 Sch. Dist., 696 F.3d 771, 777 (8th Cir. 2012) (applying the 
“reasonable foreseeability” test); D.J.M. v. Hannibal Pub. Sch. Dist., 647 F.3d 754, 766 (8th Cir. 
2011) (same). 
 113 See Kowalski v. Berkeley County Sch., 652 F.3d 565, 577 (4th Cir. 2011) (applying the “nexus” test). 
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that it was ‘reasonably foreseeable’ that the speech would reach the school 
community.”114 
For example, the Fourth Circuit ruled in Kowalski v. Berkeley County Schools 
that public school officials in West Virginia could punish a student for 
violating the school’s policy against “harassment, intimidation, and bullying” 
for creating a web page devoted to mocking another student.115  The appeals 
court reasoned that there was a “sufficiently strong” nexus or connection 
between the student’s web posts and bullying that occurred on school 
grounds.116 
Similarly, the Second Circuit ruled in Doninger v. Niehoff that public school 
officials in Connecticut were entitled to qualified immunity even though they 
punished a student for blogging on her own computer off school grounds that 
“jamfest [has been] cancelled due to [the] douchebags in central office.”117  
Instead, the appeals court reasoned that it was “reasonably foreseeable that 
[the student’s] post would reach school property and have disruptive 
consequences there.”118 
The Third Circuit has been the most speech-protective circuit for 
students.  The court’s approach does not assume that school officials have 
the authority to regulate off-campus social media expression by students.  
Instead, the Third Circuit requires a very clear nexus or connection between 
a student’s social media posts made off campus and events that occur on 
campus.119  In Layshock v. Hermitage School District, seventeen-year-old student 
Justin Layshock created a parody profile that lampooned his principal.120  In 
the litigation, the school officials conceded that the online profile did not 
constitute a substantial disruption under Tinker.121  School officials 
contended, however, that they had authority to discipline Layshock because 
his act of publishing the photo of the principal constituted a form of online 
trespass.122 
 
 114 ROSS, supra note 95, at 224.  
 115 Kowalski, 652 F.3d at 574. 
 116 Id. at 573.  
 117 Doninger v. Niehoff, 642 F.3d 334, 340 (2d Cir. 2011).  
 118 Id. at 348.  
 119 See Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 214–15 (3d Cir. 2011) (applying the “nexus” 
test).   
 120 See id. at 207 (detailing the factual background).   
 121 See id. at 214.  
 122 Id. at 214–15.  
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The Third Circuit disagreed with this approach and sided with Justin 
Layshock, writing:  “It would be an unseemly and dangerous precedent to 
allow the state, in the guise of school authorities, to reach into a child’s home 
and control his/her actions there to the same extent that it can control that 
child when he/she participates in school sponsored activities.”123    
Five judges of the Third Circuit strongly questioned whether Tinker even 
applies at all to student online speech.  Judge Brooks Smith wrote: “Applying 
Tinker to off-campus speech would create a precedent with ominous 
implications.  Doing so would empower schools to regulate students’ 
expressive activity no matter where it takes place, when it occurs, or what 
subject matter it involves—so long as it causes a substantial disruption at 
school.”124  Judge Smith explained that “the First Amendment protects 
students engaging in off-campus speech to the same extent it protects speech 
by citizens in the community at large.”125  In fact, this was extended by a 
three-judge panel of the Third Circuit on June 30, 2020, which ruled that 
Tinker did not apply at all to off-campus, online student speech.126 
Federal appellate judges have recognized that there is a split of authority 
on these online, off-campus student speech cases.  One dissenting jurist in the 
Blue Mountain case before the Third Circuit wrote: “Our decision today 
causes a split with the Second Circuit.”127 
Given the pervasive presence of social media in the lives of public school 
students, this may be the most unsettled issue in K–12 student speech law.  It 
is hard to argue with Judge Edward Prado of the Fifth Circuit, who in his 
dissenting opinion in the Bell case bluntly wrote: “I hope that the Supreme 
Court will soon give courts the necessary guidance to resolve these difficult 
cases.”128 
 
 
 123 Id. at 216.   
 124 J.S. ex. rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 939 (3d. Cir. 2011) (Smith, J., 
concurring).   
 125 Id. at 936 (Smith, J., concurring).   
 126 B.L. ex rel. Levy v. Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist., No. 19-1842, 2020 WL 3526130 (3d Cir. June 30, 
2020) (precedential).   
 127 Blue Mountain, 650 F.3d at 950 (Fisher, J., dissenting).   
 128 Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379, 433 (5th Cir. 2015) (Prado, J., dissenting) (citing 
DAVID L. HUDSON, JR., THE FIRST AMENDMENT: FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 7.6 (2012) (“[T]he next 
frontier in student speech that the U.S. Supreme Court will explore is online speech.”)).   
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CONCLUSION  
The Supreme Court’s decision in Tinker v. Des Moines was a landmark 
decision and it remains so more than fifty years later.129  While the Court has 
created several carve-outs, the default standard still comes from Tinker.  
However, several unsettled areas remain from the celebrated decision.  These 
include: whether a heckler’s veto applies to limit student speakers who 
themselves are peaceful; what is the meaning of the oft-forgotten part of 
Tinker referring to the “invasion of the rights of others”; and how does Tinker 
apply to online student speech created entirely off-campus.    
These questions have been percolating in the student speech field for 
quite some time.  Hopefully, the U.S. Supreme Court will provide these 
answers when it finally decides to review another K–12 student-speech 
decision.  Clarity is much needed.   
 
  
 
 129 See David L. Hudson, Jr., Tinker After 50: A Historic Ruling Still Relevant After All These Years, FREEDOM 
F. INST. (Jan. 30, 2019), https://www.freedomforuminstitute.org/2019/01/30/tinker-after-50-a-
historic-ruling-still-relevant-after-all-these-years/ (noting that the Tinker decision remains the 
leading standard in student K–12 speech law). 
1134 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 22:4 
   
 
 
